Employing data of one belt one road (OBOR) countries from 2002 to 2013, this study compares the contagious corruption difference between geographic border and distance through the dynamic spatial econometric model. The empirical results not only confirm that corruption in OBOR countries exists under various contagious channels, but also indicate that border effects, serving as contagious channels for corruption, are better than distance effects. The empirical implication is that OBOR countries with a common border tend to possess contagious corruption due to the hosts' demonstration effect and the convenience of transferring illegal assets. We advise that those OBOR countries should enhance the supervision of cash flow, look for any opportunity of kicking back a portion of the stolen money, and establish a specific task force on corruption.
Introduction
The existing literature proves that if neighboring countries have similar patterns of political culture, then they can affect the host corruption by controlling the countries' economic level (Becker et al., 2009 ). Frequent economic trade and similar political institutions are also confirmed as corruption contagion channels in previous literature, leaving the aspects of geographic border and distance unexplored (Sui et al., 2017) . Scholars have investigated the spatial corruption phenomenon and contagious corruption, yet most of them ignore the spatial matrix computational methods of corruption; in fact, only a few studies in the literature have looked at the difference between border and distance contagious channel. Therefore, this research uses the data of one belt one road countries over the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] and utilizes spatial econometrics as well as the panel generalized method of moments (GMM) model to compare the different contagious channels of corruption from a spatial perspective.
For the above purposes, after confirming the spatial phenomenon via spatial autocorrelation, we first establish spatial economic analysis of corruption using GMM, seeking the reliable instrumental variables approach to resolve the endogeneity that is correlated with the key independent variable, but uncorrelated with the error term.
Second, we employ different spatial panel GMM models, including a border geographic matrix as well as a distance geographic matrix, after controlling the host economic and institutional variables. Third, we contribute to a comparison between the border geographic channel and the distance geographic channel, which are mostly overlooked by the existing literature. This comparison is of great significance for the different potential contagious channels by not only determining the optimal potential computational method of the spatial corruption matrix, but also offering effective anti-corruption measures for policy makers. In the final step, we focus on a special region -namely, the one belt one road (OBOR) countries. Here, the worse level of corruption control is convenient for comparing different geographic contagious channels of corruption and for analyzing the issue from a new economic organizational perspective. As a rising international economic collaboration platform, this region's control of corruption is noteworthy for academia and policymaking bodies.
The reason for investigating the different spatial geographic channels of corruption in OBOR is rather important. First, host corruption has a demonstration effect on neighboring countries that have borders with each other (Accinelli and 4 Sanchez 2012). Countries with common borders always have similar economic, political, and cultural characteristics (Becker et al., 2009) . Second, in order to protect the handling of illegal domestic assets, local officials typically prefer transferring them to nearby areas, and such transfers lead to contagious corruption (Attila, 2008) , especially for these OBOR countries that are particularly vulnerable to corruption.
Third, as frequent commercial intercourse facilitates contacts among government officials and businessmen of multinational corporations, globalization is accelerating cross-country corruption. Countries with no shared borders may have contagious corruption with each other. Fourth, corrupt behavior disperses via intensive business contacts (Kaymak and Bektas, 2015) and international organizations (Becker et al., 2009 ). Thus, the spatial distance matrix represents rather well the contagious corruption level for countries that have no border with each other.
Reviewing the previous literature, scholars have presented the relationships between corruption and economic growth (Dong and Torgler, 2010) . The mechanisms that host corruption influences economic growth are called "helping hand" and "grabbing hand", which work based on reducing transaction costs and increasing rent seeking, respectively (Bliss and di Tella, 1997; Aidt, 2003; Lopez and Mitra, 2000) .
Some research scholars also consider corruption as the main factor impacting innovation, environment, and the capital market. In this respect, Lau et al. (2013) provide empirical evidence that real innovation activities have been hindered by the effect of bribery on patent applications, implying the "grabbing hand" effect is present through the mechanism of corruption on innovation activities. Chang and Hao (2017) argue that higher corruption in non-OECD countries decreases the quality of government, while a host country with abundant environmental performance makes it convenient for creating harmful impacts upon economic growth. Lau et al. (2013) utilize firm-level data analysis to investigate the beneficial influence of corruption on the stock market. Furthermore, the relationship between globalization and corruption has been confirmed by some scholars; Lalountas et al. (2011) find that globalization has various impacts on corruption for countries with different income levels. Bojnec (2017) utilizes OECD data, revealing a significant positive association pertaining to corruption and the host country's economic globalization.
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Academia has also shown the linkage between host corruption and nearby corruption on the basis of the argument that neighboring countries exhibit an imitation behavior for contagious corruption (Rosa et al., 2010) . Previous literature on corruption has revealed the mechanisms through which host corruption leads to decreased competition for corporations (Celentani and Ganuza, 2002; Wilson and Damania, 2005) , especially for developing countries with lower economic development and unstable state power. In fact, corruption plays different roles in economic development through the host political power. For instance, Khan (1998) reveals the different influences of corruption on an economy by comparing different patron-client networks in Asian countries. Talvitie (2017) analyzes the industrial organization of corruption in Asia and proposes that the rise of the 'economic miracle' in Asia is due to corruption and rent-seeking; for instance, the chaebols of South Korea and back door of China. The regional economic miracle is characterized by inadequate an institutional framework, systemic corruption, and crony capitalism. The OBOR countries are almost all located in Asia, and the above characteristics are distinctly observed.
The topic of developing countries' corruption usually concerns the control of corruption. Studies use a professional corruption index (Corruption Perception Index) and individual-level survey data to analyze the relationship between corruption and governance (Javaid, 2010; Tavits, 2010; Satpayev, 2014) . The results reflect that poor governance leads to bribery, and that the optimal method for controlling corruption is to improve the capacity for strong governance (Mahmood, 2010) . Table 1 lists some studies on the topic of corruption control in OBOR, covering, for instance, Poland, Croatia, Singapore, Mongolia, and others. Satpayev (2014) comparatively analyzes the influence of low governance quality of developing countries, revealing that corruption is the main reason for their low governance quality. Nguyen et al. (2012) utilize micro-enterprise data to investigate the relationship between corruption and growth for private firms in Vietnam. Riley and Roy (2016) find that India's corruption on the system of business licensing is clearly present from the 1950s to 1980s. Thus far, few scholars in the previous literature have analyzed the contagious corruption 6 phenomenon of OBOR countries.
Although the existence of the contagious corruption phenomenon has been confirmed through the spatial econometric model (Becker et al., 2009; Attila, 2008; Sui et al., 2017) borders have played a key role in the world -for instance, the United States, China, and so on (Conley and Ligon, 2002) . Some scholars prefer using distance to define neighbors in globalization related research. Furthermore, Stern and Van Dijk (2017) analyze global particulate pollution concentrations through the spatial distance matrix of the world.
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The above existing literature suffers from three problems that cast doubt on the previous conclusions. First, few scholars define geographic border corruption and distance corruption in terms of neighbors. Moreover, there is a lack of concern about what is an optimal neighbor in corruption research, with geographic border and distance having different influences with various corruption contagion channels. Thus, seeking the best contagious corruption channel between geographic border and distance is meaningful in the field of political economy. Second, the traditional literature mainly targets the relationship between host governance and corruption in 1 Few political economists are concerned about the definition of neighbor in their research on corruption. Anselin (2003) , Becker et al. (2009), and Márquezet et al. (2011) define the average corruption value as neighbors' corruption, which is the sum of the corruption values of neighbors sharing a common border, and this sum is then divided by the number of neighbors. In addition, Attila (2008) expands the defintion of neighbors through geographic distance in order to better represent contagious corruption.
OBOR, with few choosing OBOR corruption data to investigate the optimal contagious channel. As OBOR is a rising regional organization, the control of corruption there is an important issue that OBOR should be confronting. Determining the effective anti-corruption contagious channel is essential for both academic and political bodies. Overall, the empirical results in this paper illustrate the optimal contagious corruption channel in OBOR, in which the geographic contagious channel of a border is stronger than those distance one.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the tests of spatial autocorrelation, the measure of spatial weights, as well as the dynamic panel GMM approach. Section 3 reports the estimation results from OBOR countries.
Finally, section 4 offers some policy implications.
Econometric methodology and model

The spatial autocorrelation tests
Before employing the spatial econometric model, it is essential to investigate global spatial autocorrelation if the space dependence of corruption is significant. Thus, we utilize the Moran index, Geary index, and Getis-Ord index to test whether the space dependence of corruption is significant. The Moran index is expressed as:
where Y denotes a 1 N  vector of dependent variables, X denotes a NN  matrix of independent variables,  represents the coefficient vector of X, W represents the adjacency-related weight, and  is a remainder disturbance term that is independently normally distributed. We assume the null hypothesis, 0 :0
which means the space dependence of corruption is insignificant and the model is shown in model (2); otherwise, 1 :0 H   , which means spatial autocorrelation is confirmed.
The Moran index is calculated as:
where S represents the sum of elements in the spatial matrix W, and N is the dimensionality of variables. If W is a standardized matrix, then S=N, and the Moran index is normally distributed. The Moran index ranges from -1 to 1; a positive Moran index reveals positive spatial autocorrelation; and vice versa if the calculated value is negative; a Moran index equal to zero reveals that spatial autocorrelation is not significant. The mean and variance of Moran statistics are normally distributed as:
where W represents the spatial-weighted matrix, and N represents the number of cross-countries; it is noteworthy that M is the mapping matrix
We use another spatial autocorrelation, named the Getis-Ord index (Getis and Ord, 1992), and establish the distance (between the capitals of countries i and j) spatial matrix:
where x i and x j correspond to the sample countries of i and j, and w ij is the spatial matrix. Comparing the Getis-Ord index and its expected value, it is notable that if the index statistics are larger than the expected value, then there is high spatial agglomeration and vice versa.
We also adopt the Geary index as an alternative spatial autocorrelation index:
where x i and x j represent the sample observations of i and j, and is the element of the spatial matrix. The calculated value represents positive spatial autocorrelation, while the Geary index is smaller than one if the calculated value is larger than one, and vice versa; moreover, the insignificant autocorrelation reveals the calculated value is equal to one. The Geary index is also normally distributed with a range of [0, 2]. 
The measurement of the spatial-weighted matrix
We should choose suitable spatial weights after investigating if the spatial autocorrelation of corruption does exist. The different results of the spatial model are caused by introducing different weighted matrices (Pinkse and Slade, 1998; Lesage, 2000 and Plümper, 2010) . We employ the adjacency-related definition, namely border (Becker et al., 2009; Márquezet et al., 2011) . If a country has a common geographic border with others, then the elements of the spatial-weighted matrix are equalt o 1; otherwise, 0. If a country has a common border with n countries, then nearby countries' elements of the geographic spatial-weighted matrix are defined as
wn  , where n is the number of border neighboring countries. The spatial-weighted matrix of N countries is a symmetric matrix that includes elements of 0 ( NN  ) in the leading diagonal. The geographic-weighted matrix reveals whether the contagious corruption phenomenon exists through a border. A country that has multiple borders with others has a relatively higher probability of being affected by contagious corruption.
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We employ a border-weighted matrix to measure the contagious corruption effect among OBOR countries.
3 In order to think over other geographic contagious channels and avoid rows being assigned with all zeros, we employ the geographic distance-weighted matrix (Becker et al., 2009; Ertur and Koch, 2007; Mayer and Zignago, 2011; Goel and Saunoris, 2014 
Panel-GMM model
The traditional literature utilizes the instrument variables (IV) dealing with the problem of endogeneity (Ghonghadze and Lux, 2016) , and the GMM method also provides a reliable IV variable in corruption research (Sekrafi and Sghaier, 2016 ).
Since we consider obtaining consistent estimates in the presence of the contagious corruption effect in OBOR countries, for purposely dealing with problem of endogeneity, the generalized method of moments (GMM) should be utilized (Goel and Saunoris, 2014), because it is deemed as a convenient approach to avoid variables' endogeneity, while the traditional approach usually is combined with the estimated bias (Fischer et al., 2009; Dettori et al., 2012) . Corruption α ρ Corruption σCorruption β X ε
Here, Corruption it denotes the host corruption of country i in period t,  denotes the spatial lag parameter of the host corruption infected by nearby countries,  is remainder disturbance term that is independently normally distributed. The matrix formulation is transformed as equation (7): 
W reflects whether there is a common border between the host country and nearby countries. We then consider introducing the spatial-weighted matrix of geographic distance as follows: 
Empirical results
Data and variables
The data of 33 countries (shown in Figure 3) According to previous literature, economic development and political institution may contribute to the level of corruption, and we thus include the following economic variables in our estimated models: (1) gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (Real GDP per Capita), revealing that high-level income may increase corruption (Paldam, 2002; Treisman, 2000; Scott, 1969; Tanzi, 2000; Orttung, 2006) . The strict size of a state matters for leading corruption, because lower levels of bureaucratic quality bring about more chances for the appearance of contagious corruption in a society (Mbaku, 1996; Orttung, 2006) ; (2) trade openness (Trade openness), reflecting that a competitive market (in a perfectly competitive market), namely the level of openness, leads to lower corruption (Wei, 2000; Di Tella, 1996, 1999) ; (3) exports of minerals and fuel (Rent), revealing that abundant rents generate opportunities for the occurrence of rent-seeking activity, and the rent-seeking activity is associated with a high corruption level (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2005) .
In line with the viewpoint of Becker (1968) and Rose-Akerman (1996) , the 13 consciousness of corruption can be expressed as a variable of the integrity of a municipality and its citizens. We employ a variable, which is used in the field of political economy, to reveal institutional features and to define corruption as an indicator of political power (Yeyati et al., 2010) . Higher political power creates a motive for rent-seeking behavior by government officials and enhances the probability for corruption.
We thus consider to introduce four institutional variables to reflect the social and political landscapes of host corruption, consisting of voice and accountability (Voice The theory is ambiguous on how these factors influence national corruption (La Palombara, 1994; Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Huntington, 1996) . 7 Regime durability (Durable) might lead to changes in the level of national corruption. In calculating the Durable value, the first year during which a new (post-change) polity is established is coded as the baseline "year zero" (value = 0), and each subsequent year adds one to the value of the Durable variable consecutively until a new regime change or transition period occurs.
14 implying that OBOR countries have relative higher host globalization level. The Moran index is expressed in equation (3); the Getis-Ord index, which uses the variable control of the corruption variable, is expressed in equation (5) We then use the diagrams of Moran (Anselin, 2003) to prove the spatial correlation of corruption among the OBOR countries. 
Spatial autocorrelation test
The contagion of corruption channel
Common borders influence the more extensive value of the contagion of corruption channel, and therefore we intend to solve any concerns through the dynamic panel GMM approach. For the purpose of comparison, we investigate the contagion of corruption phenomenon via borders in Table 4 , 9 where columns 1-6 present the results of the panel GMM model, and column 7 reflects the fixed effects regression on contagious corruption in OBOR countries. All models reveal a better fit in that the F-test and Wald-test are significant in columns 1-7, and the model selection diagnostic criteria are in accordance with AIC and SC. Table 4 Voice and Accountability and Government Effectiveness possess obvious significant effects on corruption after controlling for the geographic contagious channel.
We next consider the economic factors of corruption. It is noteworthy that Rents in column 4 has a negative effect at the 5% significant level, proving that abundant rent-seeking behavior increases the host corruption. Introducing all control factors in column 5, the empirical results are mostly in accordance with previous literature except for Real GDP per Capita, which reflects the negative effect at the 5% significant level. 10 The empirical result of Trade Openness is in accordance with foregoing research, which advises that the host corruption in the receiving countries is conducted through a reduction of FDI (foreign direct investment) (Larrain and Tavares, 2004) . It is noteworthy that the effect of Trade Openness is tiny and Trade Openness is necessary for the level of corruption, revealing that trade exchanges among OBOR countries may be insufficient. Furthermore, the results in column (6) indicate the negative effect of globalization on the control of corruption at the 10% significant level, indicating a higher degree of globalization brings about a lower level of corruption (Akhter, 2004) .
We now investigate the contagion of the corruption effect through geographic distance. As shown in Table 5 , all models reveal a better fit in that the F-test and
Wald-test are significant in columns 1-6, and the model selection diagnostic criteria are in accordance with AIC and SC. Table 5 Table 4 , there is an obvious difference between static regression and panel-GMM regression in Table 5 . Although the institutional variables have positive impacts significantly at the 5% level, Voice and Accountability especially plays a major role in the effect on corruption after controlling for the geographic contagious channel. The empirical results reflect that greater rights of citizens for free elections and unions in OBOR countries effectively increase control over the corruption level.
The variables of economic impacts are not significant at the 10% level, demonstrating that the economic variables are not the primary factors. Hence, column (6) again indicates the negative effect of globalization at the 10% significant level, reflecting a higher degree of globalization leads to a lower level of corruption.
In Table 4 we find that the corruption contagious effect of the geographic border channel is larger than the geographic distance channel. The coefficient of host corruption has a demonstration effect on neighboring countries that share a border with each other. Countries with a common border always have similar economic, political, and cultural characteristics, and thus host corruption prefers to spread to countries on the border. In addition, the empirical results observed from the OBOR data support the view of Attila (2008) in that transitions lead to contagious corruption, which means local officials prefer to transfer their illegal assets to nearby areas (Attila, 2008) . Above all, the empirical results represent that the border channel is better than the distance channel, and that the literature should use geographic border as the definition for neighbor in corruption research. In line with the empirical results, we offer several policy implications as follows.
Conclusion
First, our results support that the corruption of OBOR countries exhibits the contagious effect, revealing that anti-corruption is not just the duty of a particular country, but also an action required through cooperative governance from a regional
angle. Therefore, policymakers should pay more attention on the proximity corruption via the border. These findings herein advise that governments should raise international collaboration for the purpose of preventing contagion from nearby corruption. Finally, multiple geographic contagious channels imply that government officials among OBOR countries should pay attention to both border and distance, especially the geographic border channel.
We provide these findings of OBOR countries for scholars who are interested in this field. This evidence can help establish a government cooperation mechanism through Internet technology that provides anti-corruption networks among OBOR countries. It is also essential for all countries to enhance public consciousness, preserve and raise press freedom, enhance investigation into corruption, and utilize modern information technology to raise control over the corruption level (Hacek et al., 2013) . Referring to the studies of Becker et al. (2009) and Attila (2008) , neighboring countries should enhance the supervision of cash flow and look for any opportunity of kicking back a portion of the stolen money. In addition, a specific task force on corruption across the nearby countries in OBOR should be established to deal with the contagious corruption phenomenon through borders. 
